|
White Paper & Bio
The increased use of networked computers in our daily lives has led
to a decrease in privacy over the last decade or so. There are a number
of technological solutions out there that intend to preserve or enhance
privacy in some way. However, we are still far from a "complete" solution
to the privacy problem, and in fact, there are a number of potential
reasons that this seems inherently difficult, some of which I discuss
here.
What some people consider a privacy violation is considered completely
innocuous by other people. Or what seems a privacy violation in one
context may not seem to be one in another context. For this reason,
privacy is not a purely technological issue and cannot have purely
technological solutions. Rather, social, philosophical, psychological,
legal, and public policy issues are also important. However, technology
can enable new policy decisions to be possible by instantiating solutions
with particular properties. Still, without a single unified notion
of privacy, it seems clear that there cannot be a single unified mechanism
for providing privacy, either.
In some contexts, it seems possible to achieve desired utility goals
while also achieving desired privacy goals. Even in some cases where
utility goals and privacy goals initially appear in conflict, sophisticated
use of cryptography can sometimes resolve the apparent conflict. In
other cases, however, the utility goals and the privacy goals are
in direct conflict. The potential for conflict increases with multiple
stakeholders with different goals. For example, a service provider
might have interest in obtaining precisely the information an individual
(such as a customer) wants to protect in order to more efficiently
carry out its business processes. The same could be said of an identity
thief. If we seek systems that can automatically infer and carry out
reasonable privacy-sensitive behavior, such systems will require a
way to distinguish between these two kinds of cases (either completely
automatically or semi-automatically with some kind of support from
users and/or infrastructure).
The notion of "personally identifiable information" or "individually
identifiable information", which is commonly suggested as what must
be protected or removed in order to protect privacy (e.g., in legislation
such as the HIPAA privacy rule), is not very robust in the face of
the extensive and detailed information now provided by the web and
other content, especially user-provided content such as blogs and
social network pages, and especially in conjunction with search engines.
That is, it is becoming easier and easier to use pieces of non-identified
information about someone, even with obvious identifiers such as name,
address, and social security number stripped out, in conjunction with
other public or purchasable data sets, to learn his or her identity.
Given the challenges such as these, is there any hope for a complete
privacy solution? What would this even mean? While I don't have answers
these questions, I think there is certainly some hope. There are many
interesting "point solutions" that provide certain privacy properties.
And the same mechanisms that make privacy difficult (use of computers
and networks) can potentially be harnessed to provide privacy as well
(such as the use of computer-readable and enforceable privacy policies
surrounding data in very fine-grained manner). The challenge is to
put these pieces together in a way that is meaningful, usable, and
ultimately, actually used.
|
|
|
| Biographical Data
Rebecca Wright is an Associate Professor in the Computer Science
Department and the Deputy Director of DIMACS at Rutgers. Prior to
that, she was a Professor in the Computer Science Department at
Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, New Jersey until 2007.
Earlier, she was a researcher in the Secure Systems Research Department
at AT&T Labs and AT&T Bell Labs from 1994 to 2002. Her research
spans the area of information security, including cryptography,
privacy, foundations of computer security, and fault-tolerant distributed
computing. Recent work includes privacy-preserving data mining,
secure multiparty approximations, and improved bounds for Byzantine
agreement in the shared memory model. Her ongoing research goals
are the design of protocols, systems, and services that perform
their specified computational or communication functions even if
some of the participants or underlying components behave maliciously,
and that balance individual needs such as privacy with collective
needs such as network survivability and public safety. Dr. Wright
serves as an editor of the Journal of Computer Security (IOS Press)
and the International Journal of Information and Computer Security
(Inderscience), and was a member of the board of directors of the
International Association for Cryptologic Research from 2001 to
2005. She was Program Chair of Financial Cryptography 2003 and the
2006 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
and General Chair of Crypto 2002. She has served on numerous program
committees, including Crypto, the ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, and the Usenix Security
Symposium. She received a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Yale University
in 1994 and a B.A. from Columbia University in 1988. She received
an honorary M.E. from Stevens Institute of Technology in 2006. She
is a member of the IEEE, the ACM, and the IACR. |
|