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White Paper & Bio
Data privacy protections might be classified as either "privacy
by policy" or "privacy by architecture" [1]. Privacy regulations and
corporate privacy policies fall into the privacy-by-policy category
while technologies that encrypt, de-identify, or destroy data fall
into the privacy-by-architecture category. Often the policy and legal
community focuses on privacy by policy while the technical community
focuses on privacy by architecture. However, practical solutions to
data confidentiality problems will likely require a hybrid approach.
While there is a growing body of literature on technical approaches
to de-identifying data, privacy-preserving data mining, and other
privacy-by-architecture techniques, these approaches have not been
widely adopted. On the other hand, privacy by policy has been widely
implemented. In the United States, privacy self-regulation has translated
into companies adopting and publicizing privacy policies offering
varying degrees of privacy protection. For the most part, the privacy
offered by these policies is achieved by the company refraining from
using personal information in ways they have promised not to use it.
In Europe (and other countries, as well as for regulated sectors in
the US), privacy regulation has resulted in legal restrictions on
the use of data. Here privacy is achieved by companies refraining
from engaging in practices that are illegal. But aside from the threat
of prosecution or consumer backlash, there is little to actually prevent
privacy violations under either the regulatory or self-regulatory
regimes. Only recently have companies begun to widely deploy technologies
to detect and prevent data leakage, and these, for the most part,
only ensure data confidentiality with respect to third parties. Within
the enterprise, there are few technical means in place to enforce
privacy policy. Privacy by policy is, arguably, somewhat effective
despite its limitations, but is clearly far from perfect.
Research problems include:
Developing privacy-by-architecture solutions that are practical for
enterprises to adopt. This will require solutions that are cost effective
and don't interfere with data uses that businesses view as essential.
Developing solutions that merge privacy-by-architecture with privacy-by-policy
to allow technical protections to help enforce policy promises, even
if they cannot fully guarantee complete privacy on their own.
Developing clear and accessible approaches to communicating with individuals
about what privacy protections they have and what choices are available
to them. Most existing privacy policies are completely ineffective
at communicating privacy information to consumers. What is a more
effective way to communicate about privacy? How can we use electronic
tools to help individuals understand and effectively manage their
privacy online without constantly interrupting their primary tasks?
One example of a current problem for which good research solutions
are needed is protecting the privacy of search engine records. Search
engine companies have a variety of business reasons for keeping detailed
records for long periods of time, including fraud detection, competitive
research, targeted marketing, and personalization. But there is also
a clear privacy interest in destroying these records or at least in
not keeping this information in a form that would allow it to be traced
back to a particular individual. Is there a technical solution that
will allow for these business uses of search records while ensuring
that these records cannot be linked to particular individuals?
REFERENCES 1. Sarah Spiekermann and Lorrie Faith Cranor. Engineering
Privacy. 2007. Under submission.
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Lorrie Cranor
Carnegie
Mellon
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Biographical Data
Lorrie Faith Cranor is an Associate Research Professor in the School
of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University. She is a faculty
member in the Institute for Software Research, the Human Computer
Interaction Institute, and the Engineering and Public Policy department.
She is director of the CMU Usable Privacy and Security Laboratory
(CUPS).
She came to CMU in December 2003 after seven years at AT&T Labs-Research.
While at AT&T she also taught in the Stern School of Business at
New York University. Dr. Cranor has played a key role in building
the usable privacy and security research community. She co-edited
the seminal book Security and Usability (O'Reilly 2005), and founded
the Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS).
She also directs an NSF-funded project that is studying the human
aspects of phishing attacks and other semantic attacks. She chaired
the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) Specification
Working Group at the World Wide Web Consortium and authored the
book Web Privacy with P3P (O'Reilly 2002). In 2003 she was named
one of the top 100 innovators 35 or younger by Technology Review
magazine. Dr. Cranor served on the Federal Trade Commission Advisory
Committee on Online Access and Security in 2000. She also serves
on the editorial boards of the journals ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology, The Information Society, and Journal of Privacy Technology.
Dr. Cranor spends most of her free time with her husband and three
children, but sometimes she finds time to play the tenor saxophone
or design and create award-winning quilts.
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