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White Paper & Bio
Coming from a theoretical computer science/cryptography background,
I tend to find more appealing solutions that provide *mathematically
provable assurances* that no significant privacy violation will occur.
Such assurances should be robustly defined in a way that does not
presume the methods and information available to parties attempting
to extract private information from published data. In cryptography,
we have been able to find such tools - the science and technology
encryption is today sufficiently developed that many seemingly paradoxical
tasks are widely used and trusted by individuals, corporations and
governments (e.g., using your credit card on the web without the actual
number exposed on any intermediate router, or backing up data on a
remote server without revealing the data to the server's owner). Alas,
in the field of data privacy and statistical analysis currently there
seems to be quite a gap between the techniques and tools that provide
such rigorous assurances, and the techniques and tools that are actually
used for data analysis. I am yet unsure how this gap will be closed:
perhaps we will have better techniques and tools with rigorous mathematical
analysis, perhaps it will turn out that the tools currently used today
have inherent privacy issues, or perhaps a mixture of both. I hope
to learn more about this during this workshop.
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Boaz Barak
Princeton
University
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Biographical Data
Boaz Barak received his Ph.D from the Weizmann Institute of Science
in Israel, and is currently an assistant professor of Computer Science
in Princeton University. He is a co-author, together with K. Chaudhuri,
C. Dwork, S. Kale, F. McSherry, and K. Talwar of the paper "Privacy,
accuracy, and consistency too: a holistic solution to contingency
table release" that appeared in the ACM PODS 2007 conference.
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